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Chapter 7 Procedures at Digital Crime Scenes 
Ian Kennedy with Ed Day 
Many readers will be familiar with the role of the ‘crime scene investigator’ (previously known as the 
‘Scene of Crime Officer’, or erroneously as the ‘Forensic Scientist’) who specialises in locating and 
preserving evidence at a crime scene.  In principle, their training and experience allows them to 
identify the best places to look for, retrieve and (to a lesser extent) analyse and interpret traditional 
forensic evidence, such as fibres, DNA and fingerprints.  However, for criminal investigations in the 
UK involving digitally-based evidence, this role is performed by what is typically termed a ‘first 
responder’ (or ‘digital evidence first responder’, a DEFR) from a police force’s Digital Forensics Unit 
(DFU), or a unit with a similar title.  In the UK police officers will receive training to act as first 
responders as part of their initial training (see chapter 6 and Bryant et al., 2013), but often this role is 
usually performed by other police staff. The initial role of the first responder is to recognise the 
sources of digital evidence that may be relevant to the subject under investigation.  Note however that 
procedures at digital crime scenes are inter-connected with the analysis of digital information and 
evidence, which is examined in Chapter 8. 
The ‘forensic practitioners’  is a collective term for both the first responders and the forensic 
investigators (or ‘digital evidence specialists’, the DESs) within a DFU, although in some forces the 
investigators might also act in the role of first responders, at least from time to time. The forensic 
practitioners may be warranted police officers or other police staff; the balance varies between forces.  
In the UK a lawful search for evidence is typically performed under Section 18 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (‘PACE’) and evidence is typically seized under Section 19. If the 
forensic practitioner is not a police officer, his or her name will usually appear on the search warrant.   
	
	
As for any crime scene, an entry plan is likely to be created before arrival if time permits.  The plan 
often includes an assessment of any potential disruption caused by search, seizure and other activities, 
for example how the seizure of a company’s server would damage its business.  Any relevant warrants 
will be obtained prior to arrival at the scene (Britz, 2004).  A power to search for evidence is provided 
for under PACE section 18. The PACE Codes of Practice also apply.  
The potential digital evidence likely to be encountered by first responders is many and varied. In 
effect where there is the capability for storage or communication of digital data is of interest. 
Locations include (but are not limited to) digital storage media used in PCs, Macs, tablet computers  
(hard drives, solid state drives), memory cards, USB pen drives, optical and magneto optical disks 
(CDs, DVDs, DRAM, Blu-ray),smartphones and mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), 
mobile navigation systems (Satnavs), digital video cameras (including CCTV) and networks (see 
chapter 9). 
Principles and guidelines for attending digital crime scenes and collecting digital evidence 
There are a number of sets of national guidelines underpinning principles for attending digital crime 
scenes and the collection of digital or electronic evidence together with developing international 
standards.  
Perhaps one of the better known examples of a set of principles are those from the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) for England and Wales.  There have been a number of iterations of the 
ACPO guidelines (although the underpinning principles have remained largely unchanged) and the 
latest edition of the guidelines (‘the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence’) was released1 
in March 2012.  The guide outlines four overarching principles that should be followed in any digital 
investigation (ACPO, 2012, p.6) and the principles are worth quoting in full: 
‘Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should change data held on 
a computer or storage media which may subsequently be relied upon in court. 
																																								 																				
1	http://library.college.police.uk/docs/acpo/digital-evidence-2012.pdf	[Accessed:	11	
February	2013)	
	
	
Principle 2: In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or on storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions. 
Principle 3:An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-based electronic 
evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be able to examine those 
processes and achieve the same result. 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for ensuring that the 
law and these principles are adhered to’.  
These are sound principles to follow when dealing with digital devices and data, and we will see how 
they can be applied to investigations in this chapter and chapter 8.   
There may appear at first sight to be a conflict between the first and second principles; the first 
principle requires that original data must not be altered, whereas the second principle refers to 
accessing the original data.  The problem arises because it is highly likely (unless certain precautions 
are taken) that the original data will be altered in some way when accessed. For example, the process 
of logging on to a windows-based PC will change the data because a record of the logon will be 
recorded in the windows registry (amongst other places).  So if an investigator is unable to adhere to 
the first principle (ie the data is probably being altered) then the second principle must be followed – 
the person must be competent and able to give evidence concerning the consequences of their actions.  
In the US the Department of Justice (DoJ) have produced a guide for law enforcement agencies on the 
forensic examination of digital evidence which includes recommended actions at a digital crime scene 
(although these guidelines date from 2004).  These are similar in nature to the ACPO principles cited 
above. For example, the DoJ guidelines require that ‘[a]ctions taken to secure and collect digital 
evidence should not affect the integrity of that evidence’; that ‘[p]ersons conducting an examination 
of digital evidence should be trained for that purpose’ and that ‘[a]ctivity relating to the seizure, 
examination, storage, or transfer of digital evidence should be documented, preserved, and available 
for review’ (National Institute of Justice, 2004). However, in the US the Federal Rules of Evidence (in 
particular ‘Rule 702: Testimony by Expert Witnesses’, much of ‘Article IX: Authentication and 
	
	
Identification’ and some of Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings and Photographs’) apply as 
much to digital evidence as to more traditional forms and hence in effect the Rules provide a set of 
underpinning principles to guide digital crime scene actions.  
In 2002 the International Organization on Computer Evidence (the IOCE) working in consultation 
with the G8 nations produced  their ‘Guidelines for Best Practice in the Forensic Examination of 
Digital Technology’ (IOCE/G8, 2002).  Section 7 of the guidelines describes best practice in location 
and recovery of digital evidence at the scene including anti-contamination precautions,  searching the 
scene, collecting the evidence and packaging, labelling and documentation. 
Finally, in 2012 a new ISO standard (ISO/IEC 27037:2012) was published dealing with 
‘[i]nformation technology – security techniques – guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition, 
and preservation of digital evidence’ (ISO, 2012a).  Of particular importance where countries 
implement these standards will be section 5 where the principles are outlined, and section 6 which 
describes the key components of identification, collection, acquisition and preservation of digital 
evidence (including chain of custody), the precautions at the site of the incident, the required 
competency, roles and responsibilities of the personnel involved and what documentation is required 
(ISO, 2012b). 
	
	
Possible locations for evidence 
As noted earlier, devices such as computers, media, tablet devices, games consoles, satellite 
navigation devices, mobile phones, photocopiers and fax machines are all capable of storing digital 
evidence. The digital information of interest to a first responder and an investigator may be present 
wherever data is stored and processed, for example in any device with a microcontroller. It is vitally 
important for first responders to keep abreast of a rapidly developing field in which products of new 
technologies may be smaller or simply unrecognisable as sources of digital evidence.   
The hard drives of PCs and the solid state devices within some laptops and mobile and smartphones, 
are obviously locations where a digital forensic investigator might locate relevant information, for 
example concerning preparations for committing a crime. Less obvious examples include modern 
washing machines whose programmable cycles use solid state memory, and which might for example 
be analysed during an investigation into sexual assault. Digital forensics can also be used to access 
volatile data of the kind normally encountered when investigating computer networks. 
 
Together with a timestamp and in some cases geo-location, data from a device could corroborate or 
challenge any defence offered by a suspect.  Figure 1 shows an example of how mobile phone data 
was used in an investigation conducted with Dutch authorities. Time stamp evidence is discussed 
further in Chapter 8. 
	
	
 
Figure 1 Using mobile phone data that included a timestamp 
 
Other sources of evidence include router and modem logs, together with any logs kept by the ISP.  
This form of evidence can corroborate when an internet connection was made and possibly to what 
location.  
The increasing availability of Cloud-based data services such as DropBox (2007) and iCloud (Apple 
2011) means that not all the relevant data may be held at the location being searched.  Although a 
Court Order may be issued to secure this online data, timing is crucial as the subject of the 
investigation may promptly arrange for a third-party to erase the data remotely. The challenge to 
digital forensic investigation provided by Cloud storage is discussed further in Chapter 10.  As well as 
Cloud-based data, digital forensic investigators are increasingly being asked to also examine the 
volatile  data from the memory (RAM) of a powered on computer.   
Having identified the sources of evidence to be examined, the next step is to secure a copy of this data 
in a ‘forensic manner’ and initially this typically concerns the preservation of evidence.  Guidelines 
on evidence preservation  have been produced both in the US (National Institute for Justice 2004) and 
	
	
the UK (ACPO 2012) as well as other jurisdictions.   However, inevitably the guidelines cannot cover 
every eventuality and hence there are times when knowledge and experience requires a judgment call 
on the part of the first responder.  For example, in some cases the judgement will be to seize the 
computers concerned (including servers if necessary) whereas in other circumstances a decision will 
be made to image the hard drives and other forms of digital storage at the location with the hardware 
left intact in situ.  This is particularly the case when data is being secured at a business address, when 
it is common practice to produce a forensic copy onsite to minimise any disruption to the business.  A 
1TB hard disk can be copied onsite in around 4 hours under certain conditions.  This is preferable to 
taking the whole system away for around 24-48 hours for it to be processed and subsequently returned 
using additional entry requirements on the warrant. Whatever the decision, it is common practice in 
many countries to expect the first responder to make a careful note of the decision taken and the 
reasons for that decision. 
Managing Suspects 
The advice to be found in many national guidelines is that on arrival at the scene any suspects should 
be removed from the location and kept separately. Any ‘advice’ they provide should in general terms 
be ignored, since they could potentially be telling investigators to perform actions that lead to 
destruction of evidence.  For example, if a suspect is asked for a password to log on to a live PC 
he/she may give the investigator an erroneous password which, when entered, causes the machine to 
run a script that destroys potential evidence stored on its hard drive.  The suspect should be 
questioned when appropriate (in most cases once they are under caution at a police station) and asked 
for any passwords necessary to access any data seized.  It may also be possible to obtain passwords 
from the scene on for example post-it notes (ACPO, 2012).  Issues relating to passwords are covered 
in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Is the Computer on or off? 
When digital devices are encountered they may be either on or off, and is important that the correct 
actions are carried out in each case.  This will depend on the exact situation; for example a PC that is 
in the process of downloading indecent images might well need to be left on by investigators, but a 
	
	
PC involved in a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) should probably be shut down as soon as 
possible.  Note that it may be possible to retrieve plaintext encryption keys (Marshall, 2008) from 
machines left in a live state (but not running destructive processes). ACPO (2012) however provide 
some general rules to follow depending on the kind of device encountered and whether it is on or off. 
For a PC that is switched off, under no circumstances should it be switched on since this would alter 
the machine’s contents and could for example start up self-destruct scripts to wipe the its hard drive.  
The power cable from a desktop PC that appears to be switched off should be removed from the back 
of the PC, because it might only be in hibernate mode, with an uninterruptible power source supplied 
through the cable.  The battery of a laptop should be removed without opening the lid as this can 
sometimes cause it to switch on (ACPO, 2012). 
If the PC is switched on then the situation is more complex.  A simple step that can be taken in most 
circumstances is to photograph the image on the screen of the PC.  If no specialist advice is available 
and it is thought that no vital evidence will be lost by terminating any running processes then again 
the power cable should be removed (ACPO, 2012).  However networks are commonly found to be 
involved in investigations.  This will frequently be via the Internet, but other internal and external 
computer networks may also be present.  An example of this would be an investigation involving the 
distribution of child abuse imagery via the Internet involving a number of networked PCs in a 
suspect’s home or work environment.  In these types of investigations “pulling the plug” may destroy 
vital information including any running processes, network connections, and any dynamically stored 
data in the RAM (ACPO, 2012).  Dedicated software can be used to investigate live systems but it 
must be forensically sound and it will leave a “footprint” on running systems. Obviously this has to be 
taken into account in evidential terms (ACPO’s second principle).  
When securing volatile data, it is not enough to simply obtain a copy of the computer’s RAM and 
analyse it.  A computer’s memory typically exists as a virtual block spanning both the physical RAM 
and ‘paged’ areas on the disk.  Ideally both these elements should be examined together as a single 
entity.  Furthermore, historical copies of RAM exist in hibernation files on laptops (from when the 
	
	
laptop has gone to ‘sleep’) and crash dumps produced as a result of a Windows ‘Blue Screen of 
Death’ (BSoD). 
It should also be a acknowledged that RAM analysis is still in its infancy and hence it is often 
necessary to corroborate findings from the RAM with other results achieved independently.  For 
example,  securing metadata (such as running processes and open ports or files) about the live system 
is useful means to compare with results obtained from RAM images.   When working with live 
systems consideration should also be given to the order of volatility of data.  A suggested approach 
(together with a study on the footprint of volatile data collection tools) has been suggested (Sutherland 
et al 2008)2. Greater detail (including suggested tools) has been provided in a malware analysis 
context (Malin et al, 2008)3. 
Preserving the evidence 
Preservation of digital evidence typically involves the creation of a forensic copy (or ‘image’) of the 
evidence.  This copy is then much more transportable and readily copied to produce working copies.  
At all times it is normally considered essential that any change to the original evidence is kept to a 
minimum.  Under certain circumstances (eg: volatile data acquisition, see below) changing the 
original evidence is unavoidable; it is necessary to perform an action that will make a change to the 
original data.  In keeping with ACPO guidelines and similar principles in other jurisdictions, when 
such actions are performed, their expected impact and the reasons for the actions are often expected to 
be recorded. 
Many professional commentators suggest that the more documentation of the scene and the of 
investigators’ activities the better: at a minimum the scene should be sketched, photographed and if 
possible videoed (Britz, 2004). 
																																								 																				
2	Sutherland	et	al,	Acquiring	volatile	operating	system	data	tools	and	techniques,	ACM	
SIGOPS	Operating	Systems	Review,	2008	
3	Malin	et	al,	Malware	forensics:	investigating	and	analyzing	malicious	code,	Syngress	
Publishing,	2008	
	
	
Copying, imaging and write-blocking non-volatile data 
In many countries (but not all) standard practice is to make a ‘copy’ of seized data for analysis, with 
the general proviso that the copied data must be exactly the same as the original data. So for example 
to copy a hard drive, a simple tool such as Windows Explorer cannot be used as this only appears to 
make exact copies.  Certain parts of the hard drive (such as files deleted and emptied from the Recycle 
Bin) are not generally retrievable by tools such as Windows Explorer and so will not be automatically 
copied.  Instead, a specialist tool (often a combination of hardware and software) that performs a bit 
by bit copy is required; this creates what is known as an ‘image’ (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007).   
The capture of data on hard disks can take hours to complete. This may not always be a problem, but 
there is a finite amount of time a suspect can be held prior to a charging decision being made.  
Alternatively, it may be that the data capture is taking place under warrant at a business premises - 
again there is again a limited time that a warrant may allow forensic practitioners to remain on-site.  
Under both these circumstances, it is imperative that the forensic data capture is completed as quickly 
as possible. 
An early action that a forensic practitioner is likely to take is to check the ‘clock-time’ on the PC 
whose hard drive is to be copied. All PCs have a BIOS clock on the motherboard, which many 
applications (some however will use an ‘internet time’ instead) running through the operating system 
will use to determine the date and time. Crucially, the BIOS clock cannot be assumed to be the correct 
date and time, and the difference with reality will need to be determined and recorded (see chapter 8 
for further details). 
For rapid data capture (also known as ‘imaging’), hardware based solutions are preferred as these can 
currently provide data transfer rates of up to 7GB per minute at best.  This would mean that a 500GB 
disk could be copied in just over an hour.  In practice, this is highly dependant on the disk being 
copied which can reduce this speed significantly.  Examples of hardware solutions include the 
Forensic Dossier (Figure 2) and the older Forensic Talon (Figure 3) (Logicube 2011).  
	
	
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 Data Imaging 
Live Forensic Discs 
A live forensic disc is a software-based imaging solution and consists of CD, DVD or USB.  Some 
solutions provide a bootable operating system, typically Linux based.  This allows a computer to be 
booted in a forensically sound manner, without the internal disk(s) being automatically mounted.  
Other solutions, such as the free tool FTK Imager for Windows (AccessData, 2010) are not bootable, 
but enable a first responder to capture live data from, say a server, that would not normally be taken 
offline.  It is possible to create an image from a live and mounted disk, but the integrity of this copy is 
not as pure as an offline, forensic copy.  This is because, files are subject to on-going changes by 
users or the operating system during the imaging process.  Furthermore, it is not a repeatable process. 
	
	
Some solutions, such as the Helix disc (e-fense 2011), provide both approaches on the same disc.  
This means the First Responder can decide upon arrival on the best approach to take and hence tools 
to use.  Many First Responders will carry a few different versions and types of ‘live forensic’ discs in 
their toolkit. They can be used if there is a need to copy several disks simultaneously, or if the source 
hard disk does not work with their preferred solution.   
Other examples of live forensic discs include  Raptor (Forward Discovery 2011) and Paladin (Sumuri 
2011). The Paladin disc also has a feature that allows the copy to be sent over a network to a network 
share on a remote computer.  This can be useful if there are not enough USB ports on the source 
computer, or if the USB ports are faulty or restricted to the slower USB1.1 standard. A write blocker 
should be used when accessing (such as making a copy) the hard disk from an original exhibit held as 
‘Best’ Evidence.  Write blockers are hardware or software designed to prevent any writing to the 
target device.  This ensures that the original evidence is kept pristine.  It is necessary to take such 
precautions as even seemingly unobtrusive actions such as reading a hard drive may change its stored 
data (Knetzger & Muraski, 2008). 
Once the forensic image has been captured a special number (called a ‘hash’) is calculated from both 
the source disk and the forensic image (see Chapter 8 on analysis of digital data).  If both produce 
exactly the same number, then the copy is an exact copy of the original data.   
Hashing 
The authentication aspect of ACPO’s first principle means that forensic practitioners must be able to 
show that any image that may subsequently be analysed is  precisely the same as the original data 
(ACPO, 2012).  A common method of demonstrating  that a data image is an exact copy of the data 
initially seized is by the use of ‘hashing’ (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2007).  A hash function is a 
mathematical algorithm (there are a number of such algorithms, two of the most popular are MD5 and 
SHA1) that takes an input and uses it to generate a much smaller “digest”.  The digest will always be 
the same for the same input, and any even slightly different inputs will generate very different digests 
(Stallings, 2010).   
	
	
As an example of a hash, consider the contents of this paragraph preceding this sentence (ie “The 
authentication ... very different digests.”).  This would have an MD5 hash of  
94696e913ca9198643a718276cd7d9df. 
 
However the hash is very different if the same input has a single space added after the final fullstop  
(ie “The authentication ... very different digests. ”). The hash becomes: 
 
4924a5ecb7592543cc3dbaf87112ac1e. 
 
Hashing has the additional useful property that hash functions are a one-way operation: the original 
input cannot be ascertained from a digest (Stallings, 2010). Note that although ‘collisions’ have been 
discovered in many hash functions these are so unlikely that in practice the system works as intended. 
The hash number generated by the calculation means that there is a 1 in 2128 chance of two different 
forensic images having the same hash value.  Put another way, if over their professional career a 
forensic investigator produced over 340 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 
forensic images, then the next forensic image produced would have the same hash as one of the 
proceeding images. This number can be recalculated at any time subsequent to the original data 
capture to confirm that neither the original disks nor the forensic copy have been changed.  
 
Volatile data 
In addition to the traditional hard disk imaging process, a more recent trend has emerged to acquire 
live (otherwise known as ‘volatile’) data from running systems. Computer hard disks contain a wealth 
of information for the forensic investigator, but some information may only exist in the Random 
Access Memory (RAM) of a computer whilst it is running. An analysis of RAM data can provide 
(AccessData 2009) information such as: 
• a list of all the processes running and terminated on the computer; 
	
	
• the path to where a program is located; 
• command line arguments used; 
• network connections (both idle and active); 
• content from encrypted files that have been opened; and  
• passwords entered by the user. 
Network based data (called ‘IP packets’) containing IP addresses, and hardware identifying data 
known as Media Access Controller (or ‘MAC’) addresses have been recovered by Beverly et al 
(2011).  This type of data can corroborate a hypothesis that two devices have communicated with each 
other over a network. (See Chapter 9 for further details).  
In 2005 a challenge was set by the organisers of the conference DFRWS 2005 to develop a tool to 
acquire RAM from a running computer (DFRWS 2005).  Two joint winners for the challenge were 
subsequently announced (Garner 2005), (Betz 2005).  Ever since there has been an explosion of 
research in this area of data acquisition (Savoldi & Gubian 2008), (Simon & Slay 2009), (Walters 
2006). (Kornblum 2007). One of the most versatile tools currently available to analyse RAM from 
Windows computers is Volatility (Volatile Systems 2007). 
Referring back to the ACPO principles, there are two main considerations when acquiring volatile 
data.  The first is the unavoidable fact that running a tool on a live computer system will change some 
of its memory (to allow the tool to be executed). Understanding the impact of this action, particularly 
how much memory is changed (also known as the ‘footprint’) is crucial to abiding by the second 
principle of the ACPO guidelines. The second consideration is that the memory of a live computer 
system is constantly undergoing change as a normal part of its operation.  Consequently, current 
techniques to capture memory are unable to obtain a ‘snapshot’ of memory, because it changes more 
quickly than it can be written to a file. Hargreaves (2009) observed that the output obtained is more 
akin to a ‘smear’. 
Volatile data is not only found in RAM. Data stored online in what is termed the ‘Cloud’ can also be 
considered as volatile. Although the data is accessible through the Internet, the data itself is physically 
	
	
stored on a server somewhere in the world.  For a server located in the UK a warrant to access the 
specified server hosting the data can be exercised to secure a forensic copy of the data.  However, for 
criminal investigations it is unusual to identify a UK located server. and Such a server is typically 
located in a jurisdiction where there is little or no means to gain lawful access to it, let alone a 
mechanism to arrest or even convict an offender.  Part of the problem is the ‘chain of richness 
creation’ problem, common to developing countries (Lovet 2009).  In the domain of money 
laundering, for example, such criminal activity benefits the local economy, which tends to undermine 
any political will to address the issue. 
In the civil investigation arena, physical access can be gained through the co-operation of the owners 
of the server.  This might be part of an investigation they have initiated or as part of a due diligence 
exercise. However, it may be impractical or unacceptable for a server to be taken offline to carry out  
a forensic imaging process of the internal disks.  Under these situations software such as FTK Imager 
(AccessData 2011) can be executed from a USB memory stick to create a forensic copy of selected 
files and/or folders.  As discussed above, the second ACPO principle must be taken into account when 
evaluating the impact of this approach.   
PDAs and Mobile phones at crime scenes 
Any PDA encountered at a crime scene should be left switched off if it is already in that state.  
However if A PDA is found to be switched on then consideration should be given to its battery life; it 
should be placed on charge as soon as possible.  This is because any loss of power or switching it off 
could result in a situation where a password is required to access it when it is switched back on again.  
The same is true for smartphones and mobile phones, however these have the added complexity that 
in order to follow ACPO’s first principle one, a phone that is WIFI-enabled must be shielded from 
mobile phone networks and wireless networks (ACPO, 2012).   Indeed, rapid isolation of PDAs, 
mobile phones and tablets from networks (including mobile data networks) is important for a number 
of reasons, not least of which is the ability of some devices to be ‘remotely wiped’.  
 Isolation of a device can be performed in a number of ways as shown in the table: 
	
	
 
Isolation Method Benefits  Drawbacks 
Switch the phone or device 
off 
Simple, cheap, immediate. A PIN or password may be 
required to access the device 
when it is switched back on. 
Place the device in a Faraday 
bag such bags allow no 
electromagnetic signals to 
enter. 
Simple, relatively cheap, 
immediate. 
Only suitable to transport the 
device since the phone will 
continuously try and connect 
to a network when placed in 
such a bag thus draining the 
battery.  Switching the phone 
to “airplane mode” may avoid 
this but will alter data on the 
device. 
Use of a jamming device Stops any alteration of the 
device and requires no 
software or hardware access 
to the device. 
Illegal in the UK and other 
jurisdictions and may 
interfere with other 
devices/networks nearby. 
Use of a Faraday tent – 
similar to a Faraday bag but 
a larger temporary structure. 
Portable and allows room for 
examination. 
Relatively expensive and 
requires time for setup.  Any 
power cables entering the tent 
need to be screened otherwise 
they will act as antennas. 
Use of a Faraday room – 
similar to Faraday tent but at 
a fixed location and 
permanent. 
The ideal form of 
examination takes place in 
such a room, since it allows 
dedicated equipment that is 
either too heavy or fragile to 
be used in the field.  Devices 
can be charged within the 
room. 
Expensive, requires a lot of 
upfront costs and planning 
and not portable. 
“Access card” type SIM.  
This is copied from the 
original SIM and thus has 
matching subscriber 
information, but the details 
required to access the 
network are removed. 
Prevents the phone 
connecting to the mobile 
phone network. 
Requires removal of the 
original SIM, which normally 
means battery removal hence 
the phone switches off.  
Requires a machine that can 
create such SIMs. When the 
access SIM is inserted data 
will change on the phone. 
Contact Network Service 
Provider to block subscriber 
account. 
 Slow: requires Network 
Service Provider (NSP) 
cooperation and  may require 
warrants. May result in future 
voice mails not being saved. 
 
Seizure and Packaging 
The power to seize evidence after a PACE section 18 search is provided under section 19.  When 
handling any electronic equipment care should be taken since electrostatic charge can damage it.  
	
	
Also grease, oil and other substances can damage equipment or contaminate it which could result in 
items becoming inadmissible as evidence. Therefore electronic equipment should be carefully 
packaged, avoiding materials such as plastic which may generate electrostatic charge (Britz, 2004, 
Bryant et al. , 2013). 
 
 
